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Abstract
Evidence shows that there are substantial rich-to-poor international capital ￿ ows although not as abun-
dant as di⁄erences in rates of return would suggest. These ￿ ows are procylcical: abundant in good times and
scarce in bad times. Conventional growth models face certain di¢ culties in accounting for this pattern. In
this paper, we propose a dynamic model of capital ￿ ows to developing countries which is qualitatively con-
sistent with these empirical regularities. The model is based on three main premises: i) international lending
contracts are imperfectly enforceable; ii) access to the international ￿nancial markets results in technological
transfers to a developing country from the rest of the world; iii) some of the productivity gains associated
with the access to external ￿nancing are perishable. We solve for transitional dynamics of the model economy
with endogenously incomplete markets and compare the results with the solutions obtained from the perfect
risk-sharing and autarkic environments. Our ￿ndings suggest that technological transfers may play a role of
an important enforcement mechanism. In our framework, existence of substantial rich-to-poor capital ￿ ows
is not inconsistent with the presence of default risk.
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1. Introduction
Several features concerning levels and volatility of international capital ￿ ows have been docu-
mented in the literature. First, international capital ￿ ows from the capital-rich to the capital-poor
countries are too scarce in view of enormous di⁄erences in rates of return.1 Second, there are
substantial private capital ￿ ows to the developing countries.2 Third, access of the capital-poor
countries to the international ￿nancial markets has been reported to promote growth and stability
in some cases but merely augment instability in the others.3 Fourth, the net capital in￿ ows are
procyclical in most developing countries.4 Conventional growth models have been reported to face
certain di¢ culties in accounting for the observed pattern of capital ￿ ows from the industrialized to
the low- and middle income countries.
In this paper we propose a dynamic model of capital ￿ ows to low- and middle income countries
which is qualitatively consistent with these empirical regularities. Our benchmark is a stochastic
growth model with two productive sectors one of which may enjoy productivity bene￿ts associated
with the access to external ￿nancing. We focus on the institutional aspects of the economy and
consider environments which di⁄er in the extent to which the international borrowing contracts are
enforceable. To do so, we solve for transition dynamics of the model economy with endogenously
incomplete markets and compare the results with the solutions obtained from the perfect risk-
sharing and autarkic environments. In addition, we examine the role of alternative assumptions
about the severity of the repudiation punishment and their implications for growth, welfare and
borrowing patterns.
A number of explanation have been o⁄ered in the literature on ￿ Lucas paradox￿of why capital
does not ￿ ow from rich to poor countries.5 Yet, the evidence presented by Reinhart et al. (2003)
1The evidence on what Lucas (1990) argued to be a puzzle, has been reported by Reinhart and Rogo⁄ (2004) and
Lane (2004), among others.
2 For instance, according to UNCTAD (1994, 2001) Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in￿ ows to developing countries
increased from an annual average of $13.1 billion for 1981￿ 1985 to $240.2 billion in 2000. Some researchers, as e.g.
Albuquerque (2003, p. 354), tend to conclude that "International private capital ￿ ows represent a major sourse of
￿nancing economic activity in developing countries".
3The World Bank￿ s Global Development Finance (2001, p. 71) report concludes that "although opening up
domestic ￿nancial markets to international competition has attracted more capital to developing countries and has
bolstered growth in some, the larger volume of capital market transactions has also contributed to a more volatile
climate". An extensive review of the empirical evidence on the topic under a suggestive title: "Volatile International
Capital Flows: A Blessing or a Curse?" is provided by Kaminsky (2004).
4Kaminsky et al. (2004) report empirical evidence on this phenomenon which they name "When it Rains, it
Pours".
5For instance, Barro et al. (1995) discussing international capital mobility in a neoclassical growth model exoge-Technological Transfers, Limited Commitment and Growth 3
and Reinhart and Rogo⁄ (2004, p. 53) tends to suggest that "some explanations may be more
relevant than others". They argue that
"...the key explanation to the "paradox" of why so little capital ￿ ows to poor countries
may be quite simple: Countries that do not repay their debts have a relatively di¢ cult
time borrowing from the rest of the world￿(Reinhart and Rogo⁄, 2004, p. 56).
This is the avenue we will follow in this paper. Hence, our point of departure is that international
lending contracts are imperfectly enforceable. In the absence of supranational authority, the avail-
able enforcement mechanisms are limited to a threat of exclusion from the international markets.
Hence, instead of exogenously limiting the amount of capital the developing countries may borrow,
we incorporate a friction which allows to a recipient country to borrow to the extent it will be
willing to repay later on. Another rationale for relying on this assumption is that countercyclical
capital in￿ ows would be predicted both by theories of exogenously constrained access to the world
credit markets and by theories of perfect capital mobility (Lane, 2004).
As argued by Albuquerque (2003) an open question which deserves attention in the context of
the models with imperfect enforcement is the one concerning the levels of international capital ￿ ows.
The reasons is that the models of international lending under limited commitment which allow for
capital accumulation in the autarky such as those of Marcet and Marimon (1992) and Kehoe and
Perri (2002) have very dramatic quantitative implications for international capital mobility. In
words of Albuquerque (2003, p. 380) "these models provide an answer to Lucas￿(1990) question,
but an extreme one". They show that enforcement constrains result in negligible international
capital ￿ ows both along the transition path and at the steady state distribution. The latter result
is less than satisfying in view of the recent evidence on capital ￿ ows to developing countries. This
is the issue we are going to address in this paper.
One of the reason for this failure is that the defaulter￿ s punishment is not severe enough. This
might stem from the failure of the existing theories of capital mobility under limited enforcement to
model certain margins. The margin we argue to be important is presence of technological transfers
a developing country will enjoy as a consequence of an access to the international markets. By
the very nature of technology, that is its partial excludability, the recipient country will not be
nously limit the types of capital which can by ￿nanced by borrowing on the world market.Technological Transfers, Limited Commitment and Growth 4
able to enjoy all the bene￿ts associated with foreign technology should it switch to autarky. This
feature makes the defaulter￿ s punishment more severe, as compared to whose used by Marcet and
Marimon (1992) or Kehoe and Perri (2002). In the context of our model, this default punishment
will introduce a wedge between steady state distributions corresponding to the environment with
imperfect enforcement of international lending contracts and the autarky. Whether this will gen-
erate non-negligible capital in￿ ows to an economy during its transition from a low level of capital
towards its ergodic distribution is the question which we will consider in this paper.
Hence, the second premise of our framework is that access to international ￿nancial markets is
associated with increased e¢ ciency of production in some sectors of the developing economy. This
increase in productivity originates from the transmission of technologies from the industrialized
world to the developing country which enjoys what Gerschenkron (1952) referred to as an ￿ advan-
tage of backwardness￿ . A substantial amount of research has documented empirically the role of
international capital ￿ ows for technological di⁄usion. Some studies emphasize the positive e⁄ect
on productivity of openness and free capital movement per se. For example, Frankel and Romer
(1999) argue that the bene￿ts from integration for a developing country partially stem from the
transfer of ideas from the rest of the world. In line with that the World Bank (2001, p. 59) Global
Development Finance annual report states that there is ample evidence indicating towards the pro-
ductivity bene￿ts of the capital ￿ ows "through transfer of technology and management techniques".
In a recent study, AlcalÆ and Ciccone (2004) provide empirical evidence indicating that openness
promotes growth through its e⁄ect on TFP.
Other studies stress the importance of FDI as a mechanism of technological transfers to the
developing countries from the rest of the world. For instance, according to World Bank (2001) FDI
has been positively associated with the productivity of the foreign owned ￿rms and with positive
spillover to domestically owned ￿rms.6 Romer (1993) suggests that FDI has considerable potential
to transfer ideas from the industrialized countries to the developing countries. FDI as a potential
mechanism of technological transfers has been particularly emphasized due to its increasing role
in the stream of international capital ￿ ows to low- and middle income countries. As documented
by Thomas and Worrall (1994) already in the mid-eighties about a half of all capital ￿ ows to the
6G￿rg and Strobl (2001) provide a comprehensive review of the empirical literature on FDI and productivity
spillovers. They also give account of other channels through which productivity spillovers occur such as movement
of highly skilled personnel, the ￿ demonstration e⁄ect￿or the ￿ competition e⁄ect￿ .Technological Transfers, Limited Commitment and Growth 5
developing countries took form of FDI. The fraction of FDI in the international capital ￿ ows kept
increasing during the last two decades. Moreover, according to IMF (2003) it now constitutes the
most important net ￿ ow for all regions.
Our ￿nal premise is that the recipient country will not be able to fully, if at all, enjoy the
productivity bene￿ts should it be excluded from the international markets. To some extent, this
feature of the model can be motivated by an inherent property of technology - its partial exclud-
ability. Similar assumptions have been used by Cohen and Sachs (1986) and Eaton and Gersovitz
(1984) who assume that foreign debt repudiation results in permanent loss of productive e¢ ciency
associated with foreign technology.
We consider a model with two agents, one risk-averse agent representing a developing country
and the other risk neutral agent representing the rest of the world. We focus on the growth
of the developing country which is assumed to have low initial level of capital. In this context,
growth is understood as a transition from the initial low level of capital towards the steady state
distribution. We analyze the model within three environments which di⁄er in the extent to which
the international lending contracts are being enforced. These are: (i) autarky; (ii) external ￿nancing
with perfect enforcement of contracts; and (iii) external ￿nancing with limited enforcement of
contracts. Under the latter regime, a developing country may at any moment appropriate the
accumulated capital and refuse to honor its debt. In this case it will su⁄er a default punishment
which will involve loss of any external ￿nancing opportunities in the future.
We assume that there are two productive sectors in the economy, which we refer to as domestic
and foreign operated sector. Each of the sectors has Cobb-Douglas technology. The risk averse
agent decides how much to invest in each of the sectors. The technology which converts investment
into capital goods is non-linear and a⁄ected by the productivity shocks. The foreign sector is
assumed to be more productive due to technological transfers associated with external ￿nancing7.
Failure to honor the external debt results in permanent loss of productivity bene￿ts associated with
foreign technology.
We consider two modi￿cations of the model which di⁄er in the default punishment a developing
country will endure should it refuse to honor its contractual obligations. First, we analyze a model
7This assumption relies on the empirical evidence reviewed by G￿rg and Strobl (2001) who document that in the
literature it is often argued that the positive spillovers only a⁄ect certain sectors of the economy.Technological Transfers, Limited Commitment and Growth 6
where in case of debt repudiation the country loses not only productivity bene￿ts in the foreign
operated sector but also accumulated capital in this sector. Furthermore, the country is deprived of
the possibility to develop this sector on its own. Similar assumption has been used by Marcet and
Marimon (1998), where they consider a partnership with limited commitment, and Albuquerque
(2003), who studies composition of international capital ￿ ows. Under this assumption, the autarkic
environment, which is hereafter referred to as one-sector autarky, is similar to the stochastic growth
model of Brock and Mirman (1972) augmented with non-linear stochastic investment technology.
Our key ￿nding from this model is that perishable technological gains from external ￿nancing
opportunities may eliminate the default risk even though they a⁄ect only some sectors of the
economy.
The discussed above assumption of the punishment is case of deviation from the optimal plan
may be judged as extremely severe. Indeed, the defaulting country loses not only all the productivity
bene￿ts and capital accumulated in the foreign operated sector but also a possibility to develop
this sector on its own. Although, the latter cannot be ruled out as completely unrealistic8, this
feature is not especially attractive in our setting since our model economy consists of merely two
productive sectors. Therefore, we consider a framework where in case of debt repudiation the
developing country loses the technological advantage associated with access to external ￿nancing.
However, the capital stock in all sectors of the economy remains productive with the TFP level
of the domestically operated sector. Relying on this assumption we consider three representative
cases which di⁄er in the extent of the technological di⁄usion.
We overcome the di¢ culty that the models of sustained growth have in explaining the rich
structure of observed capital ￿ ows and borrowing patterns across low- and middle-income countries.
Our framework suggests that under limited enforcement the pattern of capital movements depends
heavily on the perishable productivity bene￿ts associated with the external ￿nancing opportunities.
From a theoretical perspective, our ￿ndings allow to conclude that the existence of substantial
capital ￿ ows from the developed to developing countries is not inconsistent with the presence of the
default risk. We also conclude that technological transfers may play a role of an enforcement mech-
anism. In our framework even moderate technological bene￿ts associated with external ￿nancing
8For instance, former soviet republics, after defaulting on the risk-sharing agreement with Russia known as USSR,
might face serious di¢ culties should they intent to develop uranium enrichment and associated sectors.Technological Transfers, Limited Commitment and Growth 7
opportunities may substantially reduce the negative e⁄ect on the welfare of the failure to perfectly
enforce contracts. Presence of technological di⁄usion in the environment with limited commitment
induces a developing country to use foreign capital to both smooth consumption and invest more
heavily in all the sectors of the economy including those directly una⁄ected by the technological
transfers. The latter results in faster growth and signi￿cant welfare gains.
Our framework presents a case for capital controls. Contrary to Albuquerque (2003), the nor-
mative implications of our model do not advocate discouraging debt ￿ ows or encouraging FDI ￿ ows
to the developing countries. Our claim is that lenders should encourage those capital in￿ ows which
are associated with perishable TFP bene￿ts. These might include FDI in the sectors which depend
on foreign blueprints or intangible assets, such as managerial skills.
Since we study models with dynamic participation constraints, which involve expected values
of the future control variables, we are unable to use the results of standard dynamic programming.
Our methodology relies on the contribution of Marcet and Marimon (1998) who have demonstrated
that problems with incentive compatibility constraints fall into a general class of problems, which
can be cast into an alternative recursive framework. Our numerical analysis utilizes the parame-
terized expectation approach (PEA) originally proposed by Marcet (1989). A particular version
of simulation PEA which we use allows us to handle occasionally binding inequality constraints
involving conditional expectations of the future choice variables.
Although PEA algorithm approximates the true equilibrium at the steady state distribution with
arbitrary accuracy, the policy function obtained from the long-run simulations may not be a good
approximation for the solution during the initial periods. This is of particular importance for our
analysis since we consider an economy during the transition towards the steady state distribution.
To overcome this problem we use a version of PEA featuring exogenous oversampling in order to
￿nd a distinct policy function for the initial periods.
Another non-standard feature of the problem we are solving is that the optimality condition
in the limited enforcement environment involve partial derivatives of the value function associated
with recursive formulation of the dynamic problem the agent faces in case of debt repudiation.
In order to handle this issue, we utilize an algorithm proposed in Dmitriev (2006) to numerically
compute partial derivatives of the value function with respect to several endogenous state variables.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2. presents the baseline models corre-Technological Transfers, Limited Commitment and Growth 8
sponding to the three environments: one-sector autarky, external ￿nancing with full and limited
enforcement. These models rely on the most stringent assumption about the defaulter￿ s punishment.
Section 3. describes the numerical algorithms for solving the models and analyzes the solutions for
them. Section 4. introduces the main model with two-sector autarky which relies on a more mod-
erate assumption concerning the debt repudiation punishment. Section 5. analyzes the numerical
solutions corresponding to the models with two-sector autarky which di⁄er in the magnitude of
perishable productivity gains. Section 6. concludes.
2. The Baseline Model
The environments considered in the paper essentially share some features. There are two agents:
agent 1 who is risk averse and can be interpreted as a developing country and agent 2 who is
risk neutral and represents the industrialized countries. As in Marcet and Marimon (1992) the
technologies that convert investment into capital are non-linear and are a⁄ected by a productivity
shock.
2.1. E¢ cient growth mechanism under full commitment
It is assumed that there are two sectors in the economy which will be called domestic and
foreign operated sector. In the case of external ￿nancing due to technological transfers the foreign
operated sector will enjoy higher productivity as compared with the domestic sector.9 The set of
￿rms which are a⁄ected by the technological transfers from the rest of the world will be referred to
as foreign operated sector.
In this environment, the e¢ cient growth mechanism, ￿; represents a state-contingent investment
and transfer plans ￿ = fi1t;i2t;￿tg which is obtained as a solution to a dynamic principal-agent
problem for a given set of initial conditions and weights. The latter are comprised of the initial
capital stocks k10;k20; the initial productivity shock ￿0; and the weight ￿ 2 R+ assigned to the
risk-averse agent in the planner￿ s problem given by
9The technological transfers partially originate from the fact that a part of capital in￿ ows into a country will take
form of FDI. It is often argued in the literature that the positive spillovers from FDI only a⁄ect certain ￿rms in the









￿t [￿u(c1t) + (￿￿t)]
#
subject to
c1t ￿ ￿t + i1t + i2t = f(k1t) + F(k2t); (1)
k1t+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)k1t + g(i1t;￿t+1); (2)
k2t+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)k2t + g(i2t;￿t+1); (3)
with c1t ￿ 0;i1t;i2t ￿ 0;k10;k20;￿0 given.
In this speci￿cation u(￿) represents the instantaneous utility of the risk-averse agent. We denote
as f(￿) and F(￿) the production functions corresponding to the domestic and foreign operated sectors
of the economy. The function that transforms units of investment into units of capital is denoted as
g(￿). The consumption of the risk-averse agent is given by c1t; the transfers from the risk-neutral
agent to the risk averse one are denoted by ￿t: Investment in to the two sectors are given by i1t and
i2t, and the corresponding capital stocks by k1t and k2t. The variable ￿t+1 represents an exogenous
stochastic shock, the realization of which is unknown at the time the investment decisions are made.
The following assumptions, relatively standard in the stochastic growth literature, will hold
throughout the rest of the paper10: (i) the utility function u(￿) of the agent 1 is strictly concave,
twice di⁄erentiable and satis￿es the Inada conditions: limc!0 u0(c) = +1;limc!1 u0(c) = 0; (ii)
the sectorial production functions f(￿) and F(￿) are concave and di⁄erentiable; (iii) the exogenous
stochastic process ￿t is stationary and has bounded support; (iv) depreciation rate ￿ 2 [0;1]; (v)
g(￿;￿) is di⁄erentiable and concave.
A note on the interpretation of this model should be made. As in the model of Acemoglu
and Zilibotti (1997) the development takes the form of the capital accumulation in the existing
sector considered as domestic as well as opening and subsequent accumulation in a new sector in
the economy considered as foreign operated. The extent of the development in the domestically
operated sector is summarized by the capital stock k1t: Likewise the extent of the development in
the foreign operated sector is summarized by the capital stock k2t an initial value of which is lower
than that of the domestic sector.
10Similar assumptions appear in Marcet and Marimon (1992), and Jones and Manuelli (1990), among others.Technological Transfers, Limited Commitment and Growth 10
In addition to the equations (1), (2) and (3) the solution to the Program 1 must satisfy the



















u0(c1t) = ￿￿1: (6)
The model discussed above is based on the assumption that the planner can perfectly enforce
both parties to follow the plan. In the remaining of the paper, this assumption will be relaxed and
a number of assumptions regarding incentive compatibility will be considered. These assumptions
will essentially di⁄er in the extent of the punishment the risk-averse agent would have to endure
should he deviate from the plan.
2.2. E¢ cient growth mechanisms under limited commitment
We begin with the most stringent assumption on the punishment in case of violation of the
contract. We will assume that in case of default the developing country will appropriate the capital
stock corresponding to the domestically operated sectors k1t: The newly opened foreign sector
will no longer be productive. This assumption can be justi￿ed on the grounds that the newly
opened sector can be totally dependent on the technology and managerial skills transferred from
the industrialized world.11
Hence, the failure to honor the contract will result in closing down the sector which cannot be
operated using domestically available technologies. In case of debt repudiation, the country will
switch to autarky and will remain excluded from the international markets forever. The problem










11A similar assumption has been considered by Marcet and Marimon (1998) and Albuquerque (2003).Technological Transfers, Limited Commitment and Growth 11
subject to
ct + it = f(kt);
kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)kt + g(it;￿t+1);
where ct ￿ 0;it;￿ 0; and the initial values k0;￿0 are given by the corresponding values of capital
stock of the domestically operated sector and the shock value at the time of deviation. Using the
arguments of standard dynamic programming one can showexistence of the time invariant policy
functions i(k;￿); c(k;￿) and a value function V a(k;￿): Hence, the reservation value for the risk-
averse agent at time t is the utility of the autarkic solution V a(k1t;￿t) given the capital stock k1t and
the productivity shock ￿t: The optimal allocations can be found by solving the following planner￿ s









￿t [￿u(c1t) + (￿￿t)]
#
subject to
c1t ￿ ￿t + i1t + i2t = f(k1t) + F(k2t); (7)
k1t+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)k1t + g(i1t;￿t+1); (8)







￿ V a(k1t;￿t); (10)
with c1t ￿ 0;i1t;i2t ￿ 0;k10;k20;￿0 given.
Since the constraint (10) involves expected values of the future variables, Program 2 is not a
special case of the standard dynamic programming problems, and the Bellman equation will not be
satis￿ed. However, as shown by Marcet and Marimon (1998) this problem falls into a general class
of problems, which can be cast into alternative recursive framework. The recursive saddle point










￿t f(￿ + Mt￿1)u(c1t) + (￿￿t) (11)
+￿t (u(c1t) ￿ V a(k1t;￿t))gTechnological Transfers, Limited Commitment and Growth 12
subject to (7)-(9) and
Mt = Mt￿1 + ￿t; M￿1 = 0; (12)
￿t ￿ 0:
















subject to (7)-(9), given ￿t ￿ 0; where ￿￿t￿t is the Lagrange multiplier of (10) at t: The law
of iterated expectations allows to imbed the conditional expectations Et into E0: Furthermore,
reordering the terms and introducing the law of motion for Mt yields the above result.
As shown by Marcet and Marimon (1998), under certain assumptions12 the solution to the
recursive saddle point problem obeys a saddle point functional equation. Within our framework













c1 ￿ ￿ + i1 + i2 = f(k1) + F(k2); (13)
k0
j = (1 ￿ ￿)kj + g(ij;￿0); for j = 1;2 (14)
M0 = M + ￿; (15)
c1;i1;i2 ￿ 0; (16)
for all (k1;k2;M;￿) and such that W(k10;k20;M￿1;￿0) is the value of Program 2. The policy
12Marcet and Marimon (1998) state some interiority conditions needed for the existence of the saddle point problem.
These are trivially satis￿ed in the famework considered here.Technological Transfers, Limited Commitment and Growth 13
correspondence associated with the above saddle point functional equation is given by











subject to (13) - (16).
The key results demonstrated by Marcet and Marimon (1998) ensures that the optimal solution
of Program 2 satis￿es (c1t;￿t;i1t;i2t;￿t) =   (k1t;k2t;Mt￿1;￿t) for all t with the initial conditions
(k10;k20;0;￿0): That is there exist a time invariant policy correspondence   such that only the
values of a small number of past variables (k1t;k2t;Mt￿1;￿t) matter. Hence, the problem is now in
a recursive framework the solution to which can now be obtained from studying the saddle point
functional equation.
Denoting ￿1t and ￿2t the Lagrange multipliers of the constraints (8) and (9), the ￿rst order
conditions for this problem become:







































in addition to the technological constraints (7)-(9), the law of motion (12) for the co-state variable
Mt, and non-negativity of the Lagrange multiplier ￿t ￿ 0:Technological Transfers, Limited Commitment and Growth 14
3. Solutions to the Growth Models
In this section we will present the numerical solutions for various models of this paper as well
as describe the algorithms for obtaining them. To obtain the numerical solution to the models we
will rely on the parameterized expectation approach. With some exceptions, the functional forms
utilized here are similar to those of Marcet and Marimon (1992). These are
f(k1t) = Ak￿
1t and F(k2t) = e Ak￿
2t;






1t =(￿ + 1);
log￿t = ￿log￿t￿1 + "t;
where f"tg are independent normally distributed random variables with zero mean and variance
￿2
".
3.1. Solving the problem with full enforcement






















1t = ￿￿1; (25)
c1t ￿ ￿t + i1t + i2t = Ak￿
1t + e Ak￿
2t; (26)
kit+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)kit + a(￿t+1 + s)
iit
(1 + iit)
+ b; for i = 1;2: (27)
The ￿rst step of the PEA is to substitute the conditional expectations in (23) and (24) by the
￿ exible functional forms that depend on the state variables and some coe¢ cients13. Each of the
13see Marcet and Lorenzoni (1998) for further details on the implementation of PEA.Technological Transfers, Limited Commitment and Growth 15
parameterized expectations i = 1;2 takes the form:
 (!i;k1t(!);k2t(!);￿t) = exp(!i
1 + !i
2 logk1t(!) + !i
3 logk2t(!) + !i
4 log￿t);
where ! = (!1;!2): The use of the exponential polynomial guarantees that the left hand side of (23)
and (24) would be positive. Increasing the degree of the polynomial would allow to approximate
the solution with arbitrary accuracy14.
The algorithm for solving the model takes the following steps:
(I) Fix the initial conditions and draw a series of f￿tg
T
t=1 that obeys the law of motion for
the exogenous state variable. The number of periods T in the truncated series should be
su¢ ciently large.
(II) For a given ! substitute the conditional expectations in (23) and (24) to yield:
(1 + iit)
2 = ￿ (!i;k1t(!);k2t(!);￿t) for i = 1;2 (28)
(III) Using the realizations of ￿t obtain recursively from (28) and (25)-(27) a series of the endoge-
nous variables fc1t(!);￿t(!);i1t(!);i2t(!);k1t(!);k2t(!)g for this particular !:
(IV) The next step involves running two separate non-linear regressions. The role of the dependent
variables will be performed by the expressions inside the conditional expectation in the RHS
of (23) and (24). Namely, the ￿ dependent variables￿Y1t(!) and Y2t(!) would take form




Y2t(!) ￿ a(￿t+1 + s)
1 X
j=0
(￿(1 ￿ ￿))j e A￿(k2t+1+j(!))￿￿1:
14The fact that PEA can provide arbirtary accuracy if the approximation function is re￿ned and a proof of con-
vergence to the correct solution are given in Marcet and Marshall (1994). In practice the choice of degree of the
exponential polynomial can be guided by the test for accuracy in simulations proposed by den Haan and Marcet
(1994). Some practical issues on dealing with higher-order polynomials in the approximation function are discussed
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Now, letting Si(!) be the result of the following regression:
Yit(!) = exp(￿i
1 + ￿i
2 logk1t(!) + ￿i
3 logk2t(!) + ￿i
4 log￿t) + ￿it;





(V) The ￿nal step involves using an iterative algorithm to ￿nd the ￿xed point of S; and the
set of coe¢ cients !f = S (!f) which would give the solution for the endogenous variables
fc1t(!f);￿t(!f);i1t(!f);i2t(!f);k1t(!f);k2t(!f)g:
3.2. Solving the problem with limited commitment
This section shows how to solve the model with limited enforcement using PEA adapted from
Marcet and Marimon (1992). The main di⁄erence from the algorithm discussed above is that here
the participation constraint might be binding in some periods and slack in the others. Furthermore,
there is one more expectation to parameterize and an additional (co-)state variable Mt￿1 to include
into the parameterization.


















￿ V a(k1t;￿t) ￿ 0; (30)
c
￿
1t = 1=(￿ + ￿t + Mt￿1); (31)






















(￿(1 ￿ ￿))j e A￿(k2t+1+j)￿￿1
3
5; (34)
c1t ￿ ￿t + i1t + i2t = Ak￿
1t + e Ak￿
2t; (35)
kjt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)kjt + a(￿t+1 + s)ijt=(1 + ijt) + b; for j = 1;2, (36)
in addition to the inequality constraint ￿t ￿ 0 and the initial conditions15.
In order to solve this model with PEA the algorithm described for the case of full enforcement
should be modi￿ed in the following way. First, in step II parameterize the conditional expectations
in (29), (33) and (34) to yield
(1 + iit(!))
2 = ￿ (!i;k1t(!);k2t(!);Mt￿1(!);￿t) for i = 1;2; (37)
￿t
￿
u(c1t(!)) + ￿ (!3;k1t(!);k2t(!);Mt￿1(!);￿t) ￿ V a(k1t(!);￿t)
￿
= 0;
where ! = (!1;!2;!3):
In step III the participation constraint should be taken into account. One way to proceed is to
initially assume that the participation constraint is not binding, then ￿t(!) = 0; Mt(!) = Mt￿1(!);
and the solution for c1t(!) follows from (31). For this solution one has to check whether the
constraint is indeed satis￿ed, that is if
u(c1t(!)) + ￿ (!3;k1t(!);k2t(!);Mt￿1(!);￿t) ￿ V a(k1t(!);￿t):
If that is the case one can proceed by solving for the rest of the endogenous variables from (37)
and the feasibility constraints (35) - (36). Otherwise, the participation constraint must be binding,
15From (19) and (20) using recursive substitution and the law of iterated expectations yields the following expres-



























Substituting the the above expressions into (18), and using again the law of iterated expectations and the functional
forms for the production and investment functions yields the optimality conditions (33) and (34).Technological Transfers, Limited Commitment and Growth 18
that is
u(c1t(!)) + ￿ (!3;k1t(!);k2t(!);Mt￿1(!);￿t) = V a(k1t(!);￿t);
from which the solution for c1t(!) follows. The value of the multiplier ￿t(!) then follows from (31),
the value of Mt(!) from the law of motion (32), and the rest of the endogenous variables from (37)
and (35) - (36).
Now, step IV will involve running three non-linear regressions for i = 1;2;3 of the form
Yit(!) = exp(￿i
1 + ￿i
2 logk1t(!) + ￿i
3 logk2t(!) + ￿i
4 log￿t + ￿i
5Mt￿1(!)) + ￿it;
where the ￿ dependent variables￿are given by











Y2t(!) ￿ a(￿t+1 + s)
1 X
j=0





The last step is similar to the one in the the case of full enforcement.
A few notes on the algorithm should be made. First, in this algorithm ￿t will be positive by
construction. Second, step IV involves calculation of the derivative of the value function in the
autarky with the respect to its ￿rst argument. Marcet and Marimon (1992) provide derivation of
this derivative which is convenient for computational purposes.
3.3. Numerical solutions to the models
In this section we present the simulated series for the models discussed above. First, a short
note should be made on the parameterization of the model. The values of the parameters used
in the simulations except for the productivity parameters A and e A are similar to those of Marcet
and Marimon (1992). This concerns all the models considered throughout the paper. The choice
of values for the depreciation rate of the capital (￿) and the discount factor (￿) allows to interpretTechnological Transfers, Limited Commitment and Growth 19
one period as a year. The values of the parameters are summarized in Table 1.
[insert Table 1 about here.]
A note on the weight ￿ in the planner￿ s problem should be made. In all the reported simulations
the value of ￿ is set to make expected discounted transfers at t = 0 equal to zero. This would ensure
that the series reported corresponds to the equilibrium contract.
[insert Figure 1 about here.]
The simulation results for the environment with full enforcement are presented in Figure 1.
These results will be compared with those obtained in the autarkic environment (see Figure 2 and
2). The initial value of capital stock in the domestic sector is set to one, while the foreign operated
sector is initially assumed to be nonexistent.16
[insert Figure 2 and 2 about here.]
The results can be summarized in the following way. First, as expected, the consumption of
the risk-averse agent in the PO environment is constant both in the steady state and along the
transition. All the risk is born by the risk neutral agent, which is also re￿ ected in the volatility of
the transfers in the steady state.
Second, under full enforcement the developing country borrows heavily during the initial periods
in order to boost investment in both sectors of the economy. Due to the access to external ￿nancing,
the mean growth rate of output raises from 2.4% to 8.4% during the ￿rst 15 periods, and from
1.4% to 3.8% during the ￿rst 35 periods.
Third, during the initial periods the investment rates under PO environment are signi￿cantly
higher that those in the autarky. Under full enforcement, as the capital accumulates in both
sectors the investment rates decline. The opposite is observed in the autarkic environment. Higher
investment level in the foreign sector than that of the domestic is due to the lower initial capital
stock in the former. Remarkably, in the steady state the investment rates under PO environment
are more volatile than those in the autarky.
16This assumption is made to make Autarky directly comparable with other environments. In addition, as in
Marcet and Marimon (1992) we assume that the initial capital stock in the Autarkic environment equals to one.Technological Transfers, Limited Commitment and Growth 20
Finally, under full enforcement access to external ￿nancial opportunities results in a welfare
gain equivalent to a 92% "increase in consumption". By "increase in consumption" we refer to a
permanent increase in consumption that would equate the present value under the autarky with
the present values achieved under other environments
Remarkably, all of the results reported for the PO environment are also applicable to the model
with limited commitment corresponding to Program 2. The implication of this ￿nding is that
technological gains from external ￿nancing opportunities may eliminate the default risk.
A comment should be made on this ￿nding according to which the solutions to the case of full
enforcement and limited enforcement coincide. The fact that participation constraint turns out
to be never binding can driven by the assumption of the punishment in case of deviation from
the optimal plan, which is extremely severe. Should the country default it will lose not only the
technological advantage and capital accumulated in the newly opened sector but also a possibility
to develop this sector on its own. In the remaining of the paper we will address the issue of default
punishment which might give some qualitatively di⁄erent results.
4. The Main Model: Two-sector Autarky and Limited Enforcement
In this section, we will modify the assumption concerning the punishment incurred by the
developing country in case of deviation from the optimal plan. It will be assumed that failure
to follow the plan would result in the loss of the technological advantage in the newly opened
sector17. However, the newly open sector will remain productive with the productivity level of the
domestically operated sector. Furthermore, the country will preserve the accumulated capital in












c1t + i1t + i2t = f(k1t) + f(k2t); (38)
kjt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)kjt + g(ijt;￿t+1); for j = 1;2 (39)
17This assumption is close in spirit to those of Cohen and Sachs (1986) or Eaton and Gersovitz (1984) where foreign
debt repudiation results in permanent loss of productive e¢ ciency.Technological Transfers, Limited Commitment and Growth 21
with c1t ￿ 0;i1t;i2t ￿ 0;k10;k20;￿0 given.
The arguments from the standard dynamic programming will ensure the existence of the time
invariant policy functions i1(k1;k2;￿);i2(k1;k2;￿);c(k1;k2;￿) and a value function V a2(k1;k2;￿):
Hence, the reservation value for the agent 1 at time t is the utility of the autarkic solution
V a2(k1t;k2t;￿t) given the capital stock accumulated in the domestically operated sector k1t; the
capital stock of the newly opened sector k2t and the productivity shock ￿t:
Under these less stringent assumptions on the default punishment, the optimal allocations can
be found by solving the following planner￿ s problem with ￿ 2 R+ and the participation constraint









￿t [￿u(c1t) + (￿￿t)]
#
subject to
c1t ￿ ￿t + i1t + i2t = f(k1t) + F(k2t); (40)







￿ V a2(k1t;k2t;￿t); (42)
with c1t ￿ 0;i1t;i2t ￿ 0;k10;k20;￿0 given.
Once again, in the above framework, the steady state distributions of capital will di⁄er under
full and limited enforcement due to the technology transfers. This feature would distinguish the
present setup from the framework of Marcet and Marimon (1992) as far as the growth incentives
for integration are concerned.
Similar to Program 2, the present problem can be cast into recursive framework the solution to
which will be obtained from studying the saddle point functional equation. Denoting ￿1t and ￿2t
the Lagrange multipliers of the constraints (41), the ￿rst order conditions for this problem become:










































in addition to the technological constraints (40)-(42), the law of motion for the co-state variable
Mt,
Mt = Mt￿1 + ￿t; M￿1 = 0
and non-negativity of the Lagrange multiplier ￿t ￿ 0:
Substituting the chosen functional forms and simplifying the ￿rst order conditions in a manner


















￿ V a2(k1t;k2t;￿t) ￿ 0;
c
￿
1t = 1=(￿ + ￿t + Mt￿1);






























c1t ￿ ￿t + i1t + i2t = Ak￿
1t + e Ak￿
2t;
kjt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)kjt + a(￿t+1 + s)ijt=(1 + ijt) + b; for j = 1;2
in addition to non-negativity of the Lagrange multiplier ￿t ￿ 0 and the initial conditions.
5. Characterization of Equilibria
We solve the model in Program 4 with the PEA using an algorithm similar to the one described
for the model in Program 2. As before, in all simulations the TFP parameter of the domestic sector
(A) was set to one. When it comes to the TFP parameter of the foreign operated sector ( e A); we
consider three representative cases which di⁄er in the magnitude of the technological transfers.
The simulation results are summarized in Figures 3-6 and Tables 3-5. We compare three in-
stitutional environments: the autarky equilibrium corresponding to Program 3 denoted as "au" in
Figures 3-5, Pareto optimum allocation with perfect enforcement denoted as "po", and the equi-
librium with limited enforcement corresponding to Program 4 denoted as "pc". For these ￿gures
we plot the ￿rst 50 periods as representative of the transition from the low level of capital to the
steady state, and periods 100 to 200 as representative of the steady state distribution.
5.1. Equilibria with no technological transfers
First, we consider the case with no technological transfers whatsoever, which in terms of TFP￿ s
corresponds to e A = A = 1. Under lack of commitment, the behavior of the developing country
is a⁄ected by the two opposing forces. On on hand, the country wants to default on its debt,
something which would imply switching to autarky and staying there forever. Unlike the autarky
assumption of the Program 2, Program 4 implies that the country would still be in a position to
develop the foreign sector on its own with the expropriated capital to begin with. The opposing
force is the threat of the punishment for defaulting. In this case, it is the loss of possibility toTechnological Transfers, Limited Commitment and Growth 24
borrow in order either enhance growth or to smooth consumption against the unforeseen shocks or
along the growth path. As before, the characterization of the capital accumulation and transfers
during the transition can be obtained only from the numerical solutions, which are summarized in
Figure 3 and Table 3.
[insert Figure 3 and Table 3 about here.]
An important feature of this case is that the steady state distributions of capital are quite
similar across all the three environments, in both sectors. They are actually identical in the PC
and PO environments as are the distributions of the corresponding investment rates. As reported
in Table 3, the steady state capital stock in the autarky environment is slightly higher on average
than in the other environments in either of the sectors. The reason for that is that in autarky
the country has to self-insure against the cyclical ￿ uctuations of output and the only source of
self-insurance is the capital.
In each of the sectors, the investment is more volatile under full enforcement than under the
autarky. This feature is similar to the one reported by Marcet and Marimon (1992), and represents
an example where an increase in volatility of investment is desirable.
Despite absence of any technological spillovers, the positive e⁄ect of the access to external
￿nancing on growth is rather substantial under full enforcement. The growth rates go from 2.5
to 3% during the ￿rst 15 periods. Yet, this e⁄ect practically disappears once the assumption of
perfect enforceability of contracts is relaxed. The overall gains, measured as permanent increase in
consumption that would equate the present value under the autarky with the present values achieved
under other regimes, di⁄er signi￿cantly in the PO and PC environments. Failure to perfectly
enforce contracts reduces the welfare gains by the factor of 25. In fact, during the transition
the consumption paths under autarky and under limited enforcement are very similar. As can
be seen from Figure 3, the key di⁄erence is that the consumption series under PC is smoother
than that under the autarky during the transition. Furthermore, it is outright ￿ at in the steady
state while the consumption under autarky keeps ￿ uctuating even in the steady state. Hence, with
no technological transfers, the access to the external ￿nancing under limited enforcement allows
to smooth out variation of output but not keep constant consumption along the transition. The
possibility to smooth consumption through external ￿nancing results in the minor welfare gainTechnological Transfers, Limited Commitment and Growth 25
under limited commitment. As in Marcet and Marimon (1992) enforcement constrains result in
negligible transfers and severely reduce growth opportunities.
5.2. Equilibria with technological transfers of medium magnitude
The case with the technological transfers of medium magnitude is de￿ned by two characteristic
features. First, in the environments which grant access to the external ￿nancing, the foreign
operated sector is more productive than the domestic one18. Second, the productivity di⁄erences
between sectors are low enough to guarantee that the participation constraint is binding in some
periods. The key feature of this case is that the productivity bene￿ts introduce a gap between the
average steady state capital stocks in the economy with and without external ￿nancing. The latter
feature makes the punishment for default more severe that in the previous case but not severe
enough to eliminate risk of default. The characteristics of the e¢ cient accumulation mechanisms
under the three considered institutional setups are summarized in Figure 4 and Table 4.
[insert Figure 4 and Table 4 about here.]
The simulations demonstrate several distinctive features of the setup which encompasses both
productivity bene￿ts from external ￿nancing and risk of default. These can be summarized in the
following way.
First, despite the presence of the default risk in the environment with limited commitment
the capital movements from and to the developing country are no longer negligible. This result
distinguishes the present setup from both the equilibrium with no technological transfers discussed
in the previous section as well as the models of Marcet and Marimon (1992) or Kehoe and Perri
(2002). This feature allows to conclude that presence of the default risk is not inconsistent with
the capital ￿ ows of substantial magnitude.
Second, under limited enforcement the developing country borrows not only in order to smooth
cyclical variation in consumption but also in order to invest heavier during the transition and hence
foster growth. Remarkably, the borrower boosts investment in all productive sectors and not only
those a⁄ected by the technological transfers. Once again, in this prediction the current case di⁄ers
from the case with no technological di⁄usion, be it two-sector model discussed above or one-sector
18In terms of sectoral TFPs the case reported here corresponds to A = 1 and e A = 1:1:Technological Transfers, Limited Commitment and Growth 26
framework of Marcet and Marimon (1992). In other words, borrowing with an objective to promote
growth can be an equilibrium outcome even in the environment with present risk of default.
Third, the behavior of the consumption path under limited enforcement is rather peculiar.
During a few initial periods, the consumption path is ￿ at. Although it is still lower that the con-
sumption level under full enforcement, the series is well above the autarky consumption. In other
words, in this environment consumption smoothing along the growth path is no longer absent. As
the capital accumulates, the participation constraint starts binding at certain period. After that the
consumption in the limited commitment environment rises every time the incentive compatibility
constraint binds. As in the case with no technological transfers, the shape of the consumption series
reminds that of the autarky. However, during the all the transition periods there is a diminishing
wedge between the two series. This can be attributed to the diminishing di⁄erence in the accumu-
lated capital stock in the environments with full and limited enforcement. As in the case with no
technological di⁄usion, under limited enforcement the steady state distribution is characterized by
a ￿ at consumption schedule which can lie either above or below the autarky path.
Since the default risk is still present during the transition, under limited enforcement the paths
of investment, transfers, and capital stock di⁄er from those in the Pareto optimum. Transfers from
abroad to the developing country are lower in this case relative to the full enforcement outcome.
The investment rates inherit the same feature. In fact, in the sector una⁄ected by the productivity
bene￿ts the investment series falls rather quickly to the autarky level. However, due to the heavy
investment during the initial periods, the capital stock under limited enforcement stays above the
autarky capital stock during the transition. The latter result holds for all sectors including the
domestic one.
Another regularity concerns the average capital stock of the economy in the steady state distri-
bution. As shown by Marcet and Marimon (1992) the capital stock of a country in the environment
with limited commitment is lower than that in the autarky. The driving force behind this result is
the need to use capital as the only means of self-insurance in the autarkic environment. A similar
result is obtained in our framework in the case when no technological di⁄usion takes place. When
the technological transfers are present, however, this conclusion may no longer be true. Since the
productivity of the foreign operated sector is higher under limited enforcement than in the autarky,
so is the capital stock in the foreign sector. Hence, whether the overall capital stock will be higherTechnological Transfers, Limited Commitment and Growth 27
in the autarky than under limited commitment depends on which of the two forces dominates.
For instance, in the case with transfers of medium magnitude reported in Table 4, under limited
enforcement the capital stock in the domestic sector is lower than that in the autarky. The converse
is true for the foreign operated sector.
Some characteristic features of the solutions following from our framework are in line with the
documented empirical regularities we began from in Section 1.. For instance, Marcet and Marimon
(1992) state that the observed cross-country di⁄erences in borrowing patterns and rich structure
of capital ￿ ows ￿nd little explanation in the models of sustained growth. On the contrary, our
framework predicts that under limited commitment, the extent to which a developing country
will borrow depends on the magnitude of perishable productivity gains associated with external
￿nancing relative to the productivity in the autarky.
Another regularity is reported by Gertler and Rogo⁄ (1990) and more recently Lane (2004)
who document that the level of foreign debt in the developing countries is positively correlated
with their income. This observation is in line with the predictions of our model as well. Indeed,
countries which highly bene￿t from technological transfers in the foreign operated sector will be
able not only to increase production due to the productivity gains but also due to the higher capital
stock in all sectors. The latter stems from increased investment levels ￿nanced through transfers
from abroad. Such countries will tend to have both higher income level and higher level of foreign
debt.
Our model outperforms existing theories of economic growth in its ability to account for coun-
tercyclical behavior of capital in￿ ows to developing countries. The quantitative predictions of
our framework and cross-country empirical evidence documented by Kaminsky et al. (2004) is
summarized in Figure 5 . The upper histogram reports country correlations between the cyclical
components of net capital in￿ ows and real GDP for a sample of 80 developing countries for a period
1960-2003. The lower panel corresponds to the same statistics for the simulated solution of our
model.19 Contrary to the implications of the models of perfect or exogenously restricted capital
19We report the correlations from the simulated series a⁄er removing the secular component with HP ￿lter with
the smothing parameter ￿ = 400 as suggested by Dolado et al. (1993) for the annual data. Since, we are interested in
the behavior of the economy along its transition path, making inference from simulating a long series is not a feasible
option. Our strategy is therefore to rely on the logic of Bootstrap methods (see e.g. MacKinnon (2002)) to make
better use of the information contained in the simulated series corresponding to the transition. The histogram of
country correlations implied by our model is bases on 100.000 Bootstrap iterations.Technological Transfers, Limited Commitment and Growth 28
mobility our framework predicts is that the capital in￿ ows to the developing countries are acycli-
cal. For example, for the same sequence of the exogenous shock our benchmark perfect risk-sharing
model predicts the correlation of cyclical component in in￿ ows and output to be -0.86 with the
bootstrap standard error of 0.08, while the limited commitment model predicts this statistic to be
not signi￿cantly di⁄erent form zero.20
[insert Figure 5 about here.]
In our framework this cyclical behavior of capital ￿ ows is partly determined by endogenous
incompleteness of the international lending markets. The basic intuition is the following. On one
hand, a good realization of the shock increases the value of the autarkic alternative and therefore
temptation of the borrower to default. Therefore, an incentive-compatible contract requires a once
and for all increase in consumption of the recipient country. On the other hand, an expected
increase in productivity of the investment technology incites the borrower to increase investment
in every sector of the economy. This increase in consumption and investment is partially ￿nanced
through an increase in output and partially through capital in￿ ow from abroad. Hence, the cyclical
behavior of our model economy is determined by the relative magnitude of these two opposing
forces.
The reason that our models fails to predict the procyclical behavior of net capital in￿ ows is
that we abstract from a number factors which might matter. One of such factors emphasized in
the empirical literature is that government policies tends to be procyclical.21
5.3. Equilibria with technological transfers of high magnitude
When the magnitude of technological transfers is high enough the defaulter￿ s punishment be-
comes so severe that the participation constraint turns out to be never binding. Hence, the solution
under limited commitment and that under perfect enforcement will coincide. This compels us to re-
iterate the conclusion obtained earlier from the model with one-sector autarky. Our results suggest
that presence of perishable technological bene￿ts associated with external ￿nancing may eliminate
20The value of the correlation we obtain is -.13 with the bootstrap standard error of 0.28.
21World Bank (2001, p.72) tentatively suggests that ￿... the procyclical nature of capital ￿ ows also re￿ ects volatility
induced by a country￿ s own actions￿ and inactions￿ through uncertain government policies and, especially, the
underdeveloped state of its own ￿nancial markets.￿ Empirical evidence on the issue is documented in Kaminsky
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risk of default. The latter is true even though these bene￿ts are enjoyed only by some sectors of
the developing economy. The simulation results for the case with technological transfer of high
magnitude are presented in Figure 6 and Table 5.
[insert Figure 6 and Table 5 about here.]
One ￿nal note will be made concerning the relation between the productivity bene￿ts and the
corresponding welfare gains. In the reported example the TFP level in the foreign operated sector
( e A) is set to 1.35. This particular choice is motivated by the desire to ￿nd the lowest level of
e A; which would ensure that the participation constraint does not bind. In this case, the welfare
gain, measured as a permanent increase in consumption that would equate the present value of
utility under the autarky with the present values achieved in the other environments, is large. It
corresponds to the increase in consumption of 26%. Notice that these gains are driven by two forces.
On one hand, it is higher productivity of the foreign operated sectors under PC than that under
autarky which takes the credit. On the other hand, the spillovers increase the default punishment
and by that facilitate borrowing during the initial periods in order to foster growth. The importance
of the latter force for welfare improvement is more obvious in the case with no transfers reported
in Table 3. In the absence of technological di⁄usion, the failure to enforce contracts results in
a welfare loss corresponding to change in consumption of 3.4%. With introduction of moderate
technological transfers, corresponding to the TFP level in the foreign operated sector ( e A) of 1.1,
the di⁄erence between welfare gains under full and limited enforcement falls by more than a half
and becomes 1.6%. This reduction of relative welfare bene￿ts can be attributed to an increase in
the punishment for default.
To summarize, even moderate perishable technological bene￿ts substantially reduce the nega-
tive e⁄ect on welfare of the failure to perfectly enforce lending contracts. In other words, in our
framework technological transfers play a role of an important enforcement mechanism.
6. Conclusion
The objective of this study was to develop a model of international risk-sharing which would
be qualitatively consistent with some features of capital ￿ ows to the low- and middle income
countries documented in the literature. The model we developed is based on three main premises:Technological Transfers, Limited Commitment and Growth 30
i) international lending contracts are imperfectly enforceable; ii) access to the international ￿nancial
markets results in technological transfers to a developing country from the rest of the world; iii)
some of the productivity gains associated with the access to external ￿nancing are perishable.
We consider a two-sector stochastic growth model and compute optimal accumulation mech-
anisms in the environments which di⁄er in the extent to which the borrowing contracts with the
rest of the world are being enforced. Furthermore, we examine di⁄erent assumptions concerning
the defaulter￿ s punishment and their implications for growth, welfare and borrowing patterns. The
principal conclusions of this paper can be summarized in the following way:
First, we conclude that the existence of substantial capital ￿ ows from the developed to devel-
oping countries is not inconsistent with the presence of the default risk. This prediction of our
model distinguishes itself from those of the existing international risk-sharing models with imper-
fect enforcement of lending contracts such as those Marcet and Marimon (1992) and Kehoe and
Perri (2002).
Second, we overcome the di¢ culty that the models of sustained growth have in explaining
the rich structure of observed capital ￿ ows and the "wide spectrum of borrowing patterns across
low- and middle-income countries" (Marcet and Marimon, 1992, p. 221). Our framework predicts
that under limited commitment the pattern of capital ￿ ows depends heavily on the perishable
productivity gains associated with the external ￿nancing opportunities. In our framework even
moderate technological bene￿ts associated with external ￿nancing opportunities may substantially
reduce the negative e⁄ect on the welfare of the failure to perfectly enforce contracts. In this respect,
we conclude that technological transfers may play a role of an important enforcement mechanism.
Our model suggests that technological transfers to a developing country from the rest of the world
may eliminate risk of default even though they a⁄ect only some sectors of the economy.
Third, our model outperforms existing theories of economic growth in its ability to account for
countercyclical behavior of net capital in￿ ows to developing countries. Contrary to the implications
of the models of perfect or exogenously restricted capital mobility our framework predicts is that the
capital in￿ ows to the emerging economies are acyclical. A margin we abstract from in the present
inquiry that might be responsible for our failure to predict procyclical in￿ ows is that government
policies tend to be procyclical. We leave modeling this feature as an avenue for future research.
Finally, we show that absence of technological di⁄usion in an environment with limited enforce-Technological Transfers, Limited Commitment and Growth 31
ment of contracts may result in scarce capital ￿ ows to developing countries, substantially reduce
their growth opportunities and increase volatility of investment. On the over hand, presence of
technological transfers in this environment may induce a developing country to use foreign capital
to both smooth consumption against unforeseen shocks as well as along the growth path. Moreover,
along the transition path the foreign capital will be used to invest more heavily in all the sectors
of the economy including those directly una⁄ected by the technological di⁄usion. The latter will
result in faster growth as well as more substantial welfare gains.Technological Transfers, Limited Commitment and Growth 32
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7. Appendix: Derivations
7.1. Derivation of the necessary conditions in (4), (5) and (6).
Using the arguments of standard dynamic programming (see Stokey et al. (1989)) one can show
the existence of the time invariant policy functions i1(k1;k2;￿); i2(k1;k2;￿) and a value function




￿t f[￿u(c1t) + (￿￿t)] ￿ ￿1t [c1t ￿ ￿t + i1t + i2t ￿ f(k1t) ￿ F(k2t)]
￿￿1t(k1t ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)k1t￿1 ￿ g(i1t￿1;￿t) ￿ ￿2t(k2t ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)k2t￿1 ￿ g(i2t￿1;￿t)g;
where ￿1t;￿1t and ￿2t are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints (1), (2) and (3).
The corresponding f.o.c. are given by
￿u0(c1t) = ￿1t; (43)







= 0; for j = 1;2, (45)
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The condition (5) is derived using the similar argument from (47),(45), and (44). The condition
(6) follows directly from (43) and (44).
7.2. Approximating the value function and its derivative in the one-sector autarky.
The Bellman equation corresponding to the one-sector autarky is given by












+ : c + i = f(k)
￿
;
k0 = (1 ￿ ￿)k + g(i;￿0):
Denoting by V 0(k;￿) the derivative of the value function with the respect to its ￿rst argument, the











Applying the theorem of Benveniste - Scheinkman 22 yields the following condition for the derivative:
V a0(k;￿) = u0(c)f0(k) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)E
￿
V a0(k0;￿0) j ￿
￿
:
Rewriting the latter in the sequence form, using recursive substitution and the law of iterated
expectations yields








Now, rewriting (48) in the sequence form, using (49) and the law of iterated expectations yields










22see Stokey et al. (1989) or Marcet and Marimon (1992) for details.Technological Transfers, Limited Commitment and Growth 36
In order to approximate the value function and its derivative the following algorithm can be
used. First, parameterize the conditional expectation in (49) as
 (!;kt;￿t) = exp(Pn(log(kt);log(￿t)));
where Pn is a polynomial of degree n. Then, run a non-linear regression, which for n = 2 takes the
form:
Yt = exp(!1 + !2 log(kt) + !3 log(￿t) + !4 (log(kt))
2
+!5 log(kt)log(￿t) + !6 (log(￿t))
2) + ￿t;
where the dependent variable Yt is given by the expression inside the conditional expectation in
(49) evaluated the the autarky solution fct;ktg
1
t=0 :
A similar approach can be used to approximate the value function, except the parameterization
of the conditional expectation should change to  (!;kt;￿t) = ￿exp(Pn(log(kt);log(￿t))) since
utility of the agent 1 takes only negative values.
7.3. Derivation of the ￿rst order conditions for the two-sector autarky in Program 3.











c1t + i1t + i2t = f(k1t) + f(k2t); (51)
kjt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)kjt + g(ijt;￿t+1); for j = 1;2; (52)
with c1t ￿ 0;i1t;i2t ￿ 0;k10;k20;￿0 given.




￿tfu(ct) ￿ ￿[c1t ￿ ￿t + i1t + i2t ￿ f(k1t) ￿ f(k2t)]
￿￿1t(k1t ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)k1t￿1 ￿ g(i1t￿1;￿t) ￿ ￿2t(k2t ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)k2t￿1 ￿ g(i2t￿1;￿t)g;Technological Transfers, Limited Commitment and Growth 37
where ￿1t;￿1t and ￿2t are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints (51) and (52).
The corresponding f.o.c. are given by







= 0; for j = 1;2; (54)




= 0; for j = 1;2: (55)







; for j = 1;2;









; for j = 1;2:Figure 1. 
Efficient accumulation mechanism under full enforcement. 
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The model with one-sector autarky: efficient accumulation mechanisms 
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The model with two-sector autarky: no technological transfers. 
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The model with two-sector autarky: technological transfers of medium magnitude. 
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Histograms of Country Correlations between the Cyclical Components of Net Capital 
Inflows and Real GDP: Data (upper panel) and Model Predictions. 






















The model with two-sector autarky: technological transfers of high magnitude. 
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po,pcTable 1. Parameterization of the models 
Factor share of capital  Į = 0.5 
Risk-aversion parameter of agent 1  γ = - 3 
Discount factor  ȕ = 0.95 
Autocorrelation parameter of log(θ  t) ρ = 0.95 
Standard deviation of innovations of log(θ  t) ıİ = 0.03 
Depreciation rate  į = 0.1 
Constants in the investment functions  a = 0.6; s = 0.2; b = 0.13 
Note: Throughout the paper the values of the parameters used in the simulations except for 
the productivity parameters A and Ã are similar to those of Marcet and Marimon (1992). 
Table 2. Simulation results: the models with one-sector autarky (Ã = 1.00) 
Model Utility of 
the  
agent 1 
Mean of growth 
rate of output  
(15 periods)
Mean of growth 
rate of output  
(35 periods)
Mean of capital  




AU -7.44 2.41%  1.38%  2.478  -
PO, PC1  -2.01  8.44%  3.80% 2.467  92.20% 
Note: The institutional environments considered are the one-sector autarky corresponding to Program (AU), the 
environment with perfect enforcement in Program 1 (PO), and the limited commitment environment in Program 2 
(PC1). The productivity levels of domestic and foreign operated sectors are set to be identical. The utility of the agent 
1 is measured at Time 0 using many independent replications of the model conditioning on θ 0= 1, and k10= 1 in case 
of autarky and k10= 1, k20= 0 in case of the two sector models. "Mean of growth rate of output" refers to the mean 
across independent realizations during the first 15 and 35 periods respectively. The "Increase in consumptions" refers 
to the permanent increase in consumption that would equate the present value under the autarky with the present 
values achieved under other environments. Table 3. Simulation results: the case with no technological transfers (Ã = 1.00) 
Model Utility of 
the  
agent 1
Mean of growth 
rate of output  
(15 periods)
Mean of growth 
rate of output  
(35 periods)





AU3 -1.861  2.455%  1.381%  2.470  /  2.470  -
PO -1.734 3.035%  1.463%  2.466 / 2.466  3.58% 
PC -1.856  2.470%  1.384% 2.466  /  2.466  0.14% 
Note: The case with no technological transfers corresponds to the setup when the productivity levels of domestic and 
foreign operated sectors are identical. The institutional environments considered are the two-sector autarky in 
Program 3 (AU3), the environment with perfect enforcement in Program 1 (PO), and the limited commitment 
environment in Program 4 (PC). "Mean of growth rate of output" refers to the mean across independent realizations 
during the first 15 and 35 periods respectively. The utility of the agent 1 is measured at Time 0 using many 
independent replications of the model conditioning on θ 0= 1, and k10= 1.1, k20= 0.9. The "Increase in consumptions" 
refers to the permanent increase in consumption that would equate the present value under the autarky with the 
present values achieved under other environments. 
Table 4. Simulation results: the case of technological transfers of medium magnitude (Ã = 1.10) 
Model Utility of 
the  
agent 1
Mean of growth 
rate of output  
(15 periods)
Mean of growth 
rate of output  
(35 periods)





AU3 -1.861  2.455%  1.381%  2.470  /  2.470  -
PO -1.542 3.161%  1.523%  2.467 / 2.641  9.87% 
PC -1.588  2.787%  1.462% 2.465  /  2.639  8.26% 
Note: The case with no the case of technological transfers of medium magnitude corresponds to the setup when the 
productivity levels of foreign operated sectors is higher than that of the domestic sector. However, the productivity 
differences are not big enough to eliminate risk of default in the environment with limited commitment. The rest is 
similar to Table 3. 
Table 5. Simulation results: the case of technological transfers of high magnitude (Ã = 1.35) 
Model Utility of 
the  
agent 1
Mean of growth 
rate of output  
(15 periods)
Mean of growth 
rate of output  
(35 periods)





AU3 -1.861  2.455%  1.381%  2.470  /  2.470  -
PO -1.168 3.450%  2.467 / 3.016  26.22% 
PC -1.168  3.450%  2.467 / 3.016  26.22% 
Note: The case with no the case of technological transfers of high magnitude corresponds to the setup when the 
productivity levels of foreign operated sectors is higher than that of the domestic sector. Moreover, the productivity 
differences are big enough to eliminate risk of default in the environment with limited commitment. The rest is 
similar to Table 3. 